Introduction
Canada enjoys a reputation as a nation where human rights and dignity are guaranteed, democracy is respected, and diversity among peoples is celebrated. However, this reputation is undermined by a history of paternalistic, uncooperative, and wilfully destructive dominance over First Nations peoples and governments. Penetrating federal control informed the Indian Act and its continued regulation of the identities and cultures of Aboriginal peoples 1 , and their governments. The struggle to build final agreements is also indicative of Canada's resistance to First Nations sovereignty. Final agreements establish a framework for intergovernmental relationships between the Aboriginal, federal and, where applicable, provincial governments, and outline how First Nations governments will uphold self-governance and accountability to their peoples. As of March 2014, there were approximately 100 comprehensive land claim negotiation tables across the country, but, since 1973, only three self-government final agreements have been signed (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2014) .
The Federal Accountability Act and the First Nations Financial Transparency Act dictate the Government of Canada's current accountability regime. Unsurprisingly, this accountability regime is an extension of Canada's longstanding paternalistic relationship with First Nations governments. As of November 2014, 55 First Nations were not in compliance with these acts, and "[criticized] the government for imposing the [financial transparency regulations] without consultation and argue the level of disclosure goes too far" (Curry, 2014) . In response, the Government of Canada threatened to "take several actions regarding non-compliant First Nations, including withholding funding" (Curry, 2014) . Halting funding to First Nations would put the quality of life of First Nations peoples at risk, thereby undermining the spirit of accountability. By promoting First Nations sovereignty alongside institutional frameworks supported by the Government of Canada, this paper aims to explore an accountability regime that will improve outcomes for First Nations peoples during the ongoing negotiations of final agreements. The accountability regime will need to reconcile notions of First Nations selfgovernance with accountability measures to ensure that the needs of First Nations citizens are met. It is argued here that the Government of Canada can foster First Nations governance by 1 Aboriginal peoples in Canada comprise the Métis, Inuit, and First Nations. The term "Indian" is considered by some to be outdated. "Indian" is recognized in the Indian Act and used by the Government of Canada in place of "First Nation." working collaboratively with First Nations governments to identify an appropriate accountability regime. Self-governance and improved outcomes for Aboriginal peoples would be achieved through the implementation of the Kelowna Accord and the development of an Aboriginal funding structure that more closely resembles the structure utilized by the Australian government. Furthermore, using Outcome Management adapted to First Nations governance will indigenize accountability both within and across First Nations.
Background and Context
Starting in the early 1700s, Canada supported mutual respect and collaboration with First Nations governments, signing treaties that affirmed notions of sovereignty between two cohabitating, independent nations. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People states that "treaties were statements of peace, friendship, sharing or alliance, not submission or surrender" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2014) . These founding principles and treaties were later subverted by a series of policies and legal documents that actively sought to destroy the sovereignty of First Nations, and the identity and culture of their peoples. In 1857, the Province of Canada passed an act, commonly known as the Gradual Civilization Act, which invited First Nations peoples and their tribal land to join Canadian society. Lawrence (2003) observes that "the nation-to-nation relationship was to all intents and purposes abandoned by Canada at that point" (p. 7). After confederation, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald announced that it would be his government's goal to "do away with the tribal system, and assimilate the Indian people in all respects with the inhabitants of the Dominion" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2014) and Canada legally codified this goal in 1876 with the Indian Act. Milloy (2008) describes how "fundamental dualism was planted at the core of Canadian federalism" (p. 8), and two paths were forged: one for full participation of non-Aboriginal Canadians in their communities, and the other for First Nations peoples "stripped of the power of self-determination" (p. 9).
The Indian Act and Section 35 of the Constitution Act defines, clarifies, and affirms legal and governance matters pertaining to Indian status, bands, and Indian reserves. The Indian Act authorizes the Canadian government to regulate and administer governance measures regarding registered Indians and the reserve communities. The Indian Act affects all Aboriginal peoples as it defines who is and who is not an Indian, provides guidelines regarding the rights The Road Between of Indians to practice their culture and traditions, and outlines governance structures on Aboriginal communities, such as the form of band 2 councils (Justice . The Indian Act is unilateral in nature and is imposed on Indigenous peoples by the Canadian government, which is in contrast to the founding principles of the treaties, as mentioned above. This contrast is a source of discontent among Aboriginals in Canada, and the Indian Act has been described as a "genocidal" regime (Lawrence, 2003, p. 4) (Walker, 2014) . Due to a contractual clause that outlines a bonus structure of 10% on certain transactions, Chief Ron Giesbrecht received $800,000 as his bonus (Walker, 2014) . The bonus was for his role as economic development officer for the nation, which has not reached a final agreement, and the financial documents were released in accordance with the First Nations Financial Transparency Act (Walker, 2014) . Without the disclosure, "the facts, and the contrast between the nation's members' payout and the chief's windfall, would likely never have come to light" (Globe Editorial, 2014).
Over the past few decades, expectations of all levels of government, including First Nations governments, to account for improved performance and outcomes have changed. The emergence of new public management (NPM) has also reinforced the shift from the "old, ideal type of the traditional Weberian bureaucracy toward new public management approaches" (Blum and Manning, 2009, p. 42) . NPM advanced the move toward reforms where "measurement [and] outcomes have been emphasized" (Ehsan, 2011, p. 137) . One of the central features of NPM is an increased focus on public sector performance, promoting "a new public service culture where measured performance with the focus on results and outcomes will remain as the hallmarks of the system" (Ehsan, 2011, p. 137) . Since the 1980s, the Government of Canada has adopted NPM in light of economic realities that required reduced public spending, a loss of citizen confidence in public services, and a push for global competiveness (Aucoin, 2005) . This current NPM governance structure is therefore the framework in which an interim accountability regime between the Government of Canada and First Nations governments will be negotiated.
Accountability in Australia
Unlike Canada, the Australian government does not need to redefine the special legal and constitutional relationship between Aboriginals and the Australian government. During the colonization process of Australia, the colonial government's principles and actions differed from those in Canada. Morse (1984) notes, "there was no willingness whatsoever to negotiate treaties, to develop friendship, or to engage in government-to-government relations" (p. 7). As treaties were never negotiated, the legal relationship is not regulated in Australia in the same way as it is in Canada with the Indian Act. Despite the Indian Act's problematic nature, some efforts to redefine the legal relationship and outright abolish the Act have been met with widespread resistance by First Nations peoples: they were "nearly unanimous in their (Gerson, 2013) . The funding for aboriginal programming in Australia leads to better outcomes for Aboriginals, such as lower suicide rates. In Australia, the suicide rate for Aboriginal males is 90.8 per 100,000 deaths and for females is 21.8 per 100,000 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014), compared to 126 per 100,000 and 35 per 100,000 for male and female Aboriginals in Canada, respectively (Health Canada, 2014) . The Australian government provides funding to Aboriginal groups, and is ultimately held accountable for the wellbeing of this demographic.
Accountability in Canada
The Canadian federal government has two acts used to control accountability measures for First Nations governments, both of which undermine the potential for First Nations to selfgovern. The Federal Accountability Act of 2006 places an onus on public institutions, including First Nations governments, "to account for public spending in an open and transparent manner" (Prince, 2011, p. 325) . The First Nations Financial Transparency Act of 2013 requires that First Nations make their audited consolidated financial statements and a schedule of remuneration and expenses available to their members, as well as publish it. These acts strengthen administrative control, and audit and oversight functions of government and parliament, thus "depoliticizing Canada-Aboriginal relations and disempowering First Nations" (Prince, 2011, p. 327) . Though they emphasize interdependence between First Nations and the federal government, the logic of the model suggests that most First Nations governments cannot control the administrative apparatus that shapes Aboriginal lives. First Nations governments must continue to be "municipal-like governments, junior partners to Ottawa, under close supervision by the Department of Indian Affairs and other federal agencies" (Prince, 2011, p. 327 , 2006) . Though the Conservative government expressed concern over the funding, data, and fiduciary relationship, with "sufficient resources and perseverance" (Patterson, 2006) the Kelowna Accord would foster self-governance and improve the lives of First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples.
Outcome Management
Outcome Management ensures that First Nations governments have self-determination and control over the processes and outcomes for their peoples. Outcome Management is a strategic approach to ensure that "initiatives are designed around [intended] outcomes" (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2014). Using Outcome Management, First Nations governments can actualize their own accountability management, similar to a project manager's control of their own process within a wider framework. In collaboration with the Government of Canada, First Nations governments can identify "milestones" (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2014) or leading indicators towards attaining the desired outcomes for Ultimately, to ensure the long-term protection of First Nations sovereignty rights, the paternalistic Indian Act would need to be entirely reworked from its current form: the Constitution would need to be reopened, and section 35 would need to be revised. Historically, changes to the Indian Act have been imposed unilaterally by Canada, but if self-governance and self-determination is to be achieved, then First Nations governments must have a hand in future Indian Act revisions. Furthermore, the "non-specific nature" of the constitutional text means that Canadian Aboriginal resources, such as funding and programming, and willingness to work collaboratively with First Nations governments will always "depend on the government of the day" (Brunet-Jailly, 2008, p. 8) and so First Nations' autonomy and potential are not guaranteed. If the Constitution Act is reopened, then the pressure to deal with other provincial affairs and governance issues will distract the conversation, and undermine the voices of First Nations governments. As Bryden (2011) observes about the Meech and Charlottetown constitutional revisions, negotiations quickly became a "swamp of conflicting demands from provinces and various interest groups." To mitigate these distractions, the intents and purpose of constitutional revisions regarding First Nations governance will need to be supported and affirmed by Canada.
While final agreements are being negotiated, the Government of Canada has a responsibility to uphold the collaborative spirit of the treaties and to improve outcomes for First Nations peoples. The current accountability regime, dictated by the Accountability Act and the First Nations Financial Transparency Act, cannot accommodate any notion of self-governance for First Nations governments, and current funding arrangements are not adequately improving First Nations peoples' quality of life. This accountability regime must be replaced with a framework such as Outcome Management to foster an environment conducive to selfgovernance. Furthermore, implementation of the Kelowna Accord will ensure that the needs of First Nations citizens are met. The accountability system for a First Nation will be a "negotiated order; the result of bargaining compromising by all sides, learning and adapting practices over time" (Prince, 2011, p. 327) . The federal government must take the opportunity to empower First Nations governments and promote governance systems with the capacity, size, resources and legitimacy to provide effective governance for and by Aboriginal peoples.
